Riviste / Discipline Filosofiche / A partire da Husserl / Dire et penser “je” : La vacuité de la présence à soi du sujet de Husserl à Derrida

Although Husserl is known for having developed a substantial theory of subjectivity across his transcendental phenomenology, he explicitly and purposefully left aside the question of the subject in his early groundwork, the Logical Investigations. This article investigates the reasons for this philosophical decision and claims that the theory of indexical meanings developed in the first and sixth Logical Investigations provides a sophisticated analysis of the first-person pronoun that legitimates Husserl’s choice: in the absence of a fully-fledged concept of subjectivity in Husserl’s early works, the theory of “occasional expressions” addresses the question of the subject by examining the phenomenological conditions of one’s ability to meaningfully make use of the pronoun “I”. The article argues against Derrida’s reading of the first Logical Investigation that the expression of the first-person is somehow insensitive to the prospect of intuitive presencing and epistemic fulfilment.