In this article, I try to demonstrate the outline of Hans Blumenberg’s critical interpretation of Husserl’s transcendental phenomenology. My argument is that according to Blumenberg there is an incompatible disruption between the phenomenological description as a method and its transcendental claim. While Husserl’s point of departure in descriptive phenomenology is the given experience in its factual limitations, he forgets these limitations in his transcendental turn and assumes the apodicticity of absolute consciousness. Blumenberg does not follow Husserl in his transcendental turn. Instead, he rather tries to lead the philosophical reflection back to its factual situation. By so doing, he faces Husserl’s slogan “back to things themselves!” with two questions: “from where?” and “back to where?”. With these questions, Blumenberg tries to understand where the phenomenologist stands himself as a human being in his work and to what extent his philosophy is influenced by his engagement with the world.